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US-ROC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP:
A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW*
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, a
great deal of attention has been given to the question of what
benefits would be gained from improved relations between the
United States and the People's Republic of China. Aside from the
fundamental geopolitical advantage of keeping the USSR and the
PRC from greater solidarity, there have been high expectations as
to the eventual economic benefits which will accrue to both
countries.
At first blush these benefits seem well worth achieving.
Certainly very few of us would take issue with the goal of keeping
two communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., or
support the argument that we should continue to ignore the 850
million Chinese on the Mainland. But when it comes to the
economic issues, we believe that these have not been adequately
analyzed, and that they should be thoroughly assessed before any
further steps are taken toward normalization with the PRC. In
essence, we think that the U.S. Government has expected more
gains than can be realized.. . but more importantly, we think it
has totally ignored the potential losses.
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For the past few years, the American Chamber of Commerce
in the Republic of China has supported positions which favor the
expansion of commercial and cultural relations between the U.S.
and the PRC, provided this is not done at the expense of the
Republic of China. Our position has echoed the recent resolution
by a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, which states
"that the U.S. Government, while engaged in reducing tensions
with the PRC, do nothing to compromise the freedom of the
Republic of China and its 16 million people." Basically we believe
that the long standing American relationship with the Chinese
who have made Taiwan a flourishing example of economic and
cultural cooperation should not be sacrificed for a political
objective which does not give comparable reciprocity to American
initiatives.
This position paper has been prepared by members of the
American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China, an
organization of U.S. business executives who manage some 220
U.S. invested corporations in Taiwan. The Chamber's prime
objective is to enhance and protect American trade, investment
and credit relations with the Republic of China.
B. U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE TWO CHINAS
While the opening of U.S. commercial relations with the PRC
began in an encouraging way and with great expectations, they
still give no opportunities for normal commerce; even the cultural
and tourist interchange has been unilaterally restricted by the
PRC to minimum levels. The U.S. two-way trade with the PRC in
1975 declined to $462 million (from $922 million in 1974) while the
U.S. did $3.5 billion in two-way trade with Taiwan in 1975.
The PRC refuses to accept credits from foreign trading
partners including the U.S. and has generally confined commer-
cial contacts to the Canton Trade Fair. The PRC also refuses to
permit American buying or selling offices to operate in the
country and refuses to permit American banks to handle financial
and trade transactions between the two countries.
In extreme contrast, the Republic of China on Taiwan has
consistently offered full business reciprocity, investment oppor-
tunities and unlimited support to two-way commercial inter-
change, to a point where our two-way trade with them made
Taiwan America's 13th largest trading partner in 1975. This
created opportunities for thousands of export-related jobs in the
United States. Also, U.S. investment as of July 1976 amounted to
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$476 million and has prospered in one of the most hospitable
investment climates in the Asia-Pacific area. In addition, Taiwan
has also opened its arms to American religious groups, scholars
and tourists serving to maintain our long standing relationships
with the Chinese people at a high level of compatibility and
cooperation.
It could be argued that normalization of the political
relationship should begin at least to remedy the lack of
commercial and cultural reciprocity, but thus far this is not
supported by the experiences of other countries which do have
diplomatic relations with the PRC. It appears that reciprocity is
not a 50-50 proposition with the PRC.
C. WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE U.S.?
Yet there still seems to be a compulsion to forego the tried-
and-true relationship with the ROC in favor of the hope of great
economic benefits from the PRC. And even more alarming, we
observe a sense of urgency in the U.S. Government's desire to
culminate normalization with the PRC "before it's too late."
Admittedly, the public posture of the current Administration is
low at present, no doubt due to the Presidential election campaign.
But the stated goal is still "normalization" and we perceive that
even though it is alleged that there is no time-table and no
formula, there appears to be an academic and State Department
groundswell (possibly amplified by press speculation) which is
anxious to conclude an early agreement with the PRC. We believe
this issue will surface rapidly once a new president is elected.
Therefore, it is essential that we analyze what the real
economic benefits to the U.S. will be - or put more colloquially,
what's ih it for the U.S.? An analysis follows as to the prospects of
improved US-PRC trade based on the assumed condition of
diplomatic recognition.
D. WHAT'S THE REAL MARKET POTENTIAL WITH THE PRC?
When we evaluate the PRC's past buying policy we find that
the potential market for U.S. products is limited to a few select
product categories, that the purchases are non-recurrent, that the
availability of a broad consumer market base may well be 40 to 50
years away, and that the emphasis is on self-sufficiency which
exhibits itself in an interest in technology rather than in products.
In addition, the fact that the PRC is a non-market economy will
affect the ability of U.S. exporters to sell their products on a
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competitive and reciprocal basis; there are many import restric-
tions levied on a variety of products which limit the current as
well as eventual market potential. Furthermore, the absence of
free choice by the consumer will restrict the ability of U.S.
exporters to develop new markets for their products. Brief
comments are given below on the three most important categories:
Industrial Products
In line with former Premier Chou En-lai's report to the 4th
National People's Congress, one of the PRC goals is to build "an
independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and eco-
nomic system by 1980." Therefore it is reasonable to expect that
the PRC will be looking abroad for equipment during the next few
years. But history has shown that they are more interested in
technology than in equipment, with some limited exceptions to
meet their urgent needs where either their capacity or technical
know-how is limited. Some of the examples are the purchases of
jet aircraft, fertilizer plants, and deep-well oil drilling platforms.
In the case of the aircraft sale, the PRC technology is obviously
not at a comparable level to the U.S., and purchases of this type
are expected to continue. As for the fertilizer plants, this is a good
example of a dire need to supplement their capacity on a one-time
basis. The same holds true for the oil drilling platforms; after
purchasing several from Japan, France and Norway, the PRC is
now manufacturing their own.
Consumer Products
Even though the PRC is a rich land with numerous natural
resources, many areas are still uninhabited and thus have little or
no infrastructure. In short, its economic development may well be
some 40 to 50 years away from where the needs of its people can
be matched to the richness of its resources. Therefore, the
opportunity for selling U.S. consumer goods appears to be at least
two generations away. A good example is provided by the
Japanese: to date they have not managed to sell any consumer
products to the PRC.
Agricultural Products
As for a sustained favorable outlook for agricultural products,
it is not expected that the PRC will remain a large importer of
foodstuffs for long. Less than 20% of its total land surface is now
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cultivated, which is quite low compared to its potential arable
acreage. In addition the current per acre yield is very low due to a
lack of fertilizer and pesticides as well as a limited irrigation
system. Therefore, the capability of the PRC to increase its
agricultural output is substantial, large enough to be a threat as
an eventual competitor to the U.S. in their surplus crop years.
After analyzing the economic realities, the prospects of
significantly increasing trade between the U.S. and the PRC are
certainly not optimistic. So the question remains, What's in it for
the U.S., particularly if it is to be accomplished at the expense of a
valued trading partner, the Republic of China?
E. DISADVANTAGES TO THE U.S.
Now let's turn our attention to what the potential loss would
be to our economic relations with the Republic of China. There are
basically two scenarios; the first involves de-facto derecognition of
the ROC without regard to how future trade, investment and
credit relations would be handled. In this first scenario we would
also assume the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty,
inasmuch as we understand that it may not be possible to have a
Defense Treaty with a country with which we have no diplomatic
relations.
Without sounding ominous and without making any predic-
tions as to what the PRC and ROC might do militarily, our feeling
is that we in Taiwan would experience serious difficulties in doing
business. There could be a degree of social unrest which might
vent itself on American companies. Further investment would
stop, and capital flight would be probable. In short, sudden
diplomatic derecognition without any redress does not provide a
positive outlook for U.S. economic interests. (Frankly speaking, it
seems inconceivable and unrealistic that such a scenario would
take place; in all our 200 year history there is no precedence for
abandoning a trusted ally and valued trading partner in the way
just described.)
A second scenario involves "normalization" with the PRC but
not under the three conditions outlined by the PRC (diplomatic
recognition, U.S. troop withdrawal, and abrogation of the Mutual
Defense Treaty). We particularly believe that the third condition,
that of abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, is totally
unacceptable to the protection of American economic interests
with the Republic of China. In short, the Mutual Defense Treaty is
central to our economic survival on Taiwan. Without offering any
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new "formula" for solution, we will state a number of additional
issues which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken
toward normalization with the PRC. We hope that the U.S.
Government is already working on these areas. It is critically
important that solutions be found to these problems.
F. ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED
1. Eximbank Loans and Guarantees
As of December 1975, the ROC had loans and guarantees
outstanding in the amount of more than US$1.7 billion, thus
making it the Eximbank's largest customer after Brazil. What
happens to these funds and will Taiwan be eligible for loans in the
future?
2. U.S. Banks on Taiwan
As of July 1976, there were eight U.S. banks represented on
Taiwan. What will be their status after normalization? Will they
be allowed to continue their operations in Taiwan?
3. U.S. Investment on Taiwan
As of July 1976, there was some US$476 million worth of U.S.
investment on Taiwan. This investment is distributed across the
range of the country's industrial projects and infrastructure. A
series of questions arise which are currently adequately answered
under the present Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
Treaty of 1948, but which will need review if the FCN Treaty were
not to be in force.
Will this investment have national treatment, meaning that
U.S. investment will be subject to the same laws and enjoy the
same rights as do domestic enterprises of the host country?
In the event of expropriation or nationalization for a public
purpose, will it be done without discrimination and accompanied
by prompt, adequate and effective compensation?
Will compensation under expropriation amount to the market
value immediately before the expropriation itself or before the
host government's official announcement that expropriation will
occur?
Will there be international arbitration in the event of a
dispute between the U.S. investor and the host country?
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4. Overseas Private Insurance Company
(OPIC) Coverage
As of July 1976, the maximum contract value of OPIC
insurance was $132 million for inconvertability, $153 million for
expropriation, and $137 million for war. Could additional
coverage be obtained?
5. Textile Quotas to the U.S.
Taiwan's textile exports to the U.S. fall under the 1974 Multi-
Fibre Agreement, the international framework for voluntary
bilateral restraints between textile exporters and importers. On
the other hand, the PRC has been unwilling to subscribe to any
voluntary trade restraints, even with countries with which it has
diplomatic relations. What happens to Chinese textile exports to
the U.S.?
6. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Taiwan
In 1975, the U.S. exported some $420 million worth of
agricultural products to Taiwan. Most of these exports are
conducted under several long-range agreements negotiated be-
tween the U.S. and the ROC. What happens to these agreements?
7. Nuclear Fuel for Taiwan's Nuclear
Power Plants
Currently two nuclear power plants are under construction in
Taiwan, and four more are planned. Under what conditions will
Taiwan be able to obtain nuclear fuels for these plants?
8. Generalized Preference Scheme
Will Taiwan still be eligible for duty reductions under the
Generalized Preference Scheme?
9. Most Favored Nation Treatment
The ROC currently has MFN treatment, but the PRC does not.
Before MFN can be granted by the U.S. President to the PRC, the
Trade Act of 1974 requires that a bilateral trade agreement be
negotiated first, and then be approved by the U.S. Congress. Part
and parcel of Congressional approval is the settlement of frozen
assets, which has been an extremely thorny issue thus far.
Anyway, what happens to the ROC's Most Favored Nation
standing?
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10. Concerns for U.S. Security
We do not profess to be experts in international security
matters, but as U.S. citizens, we are vitally concerned with the
security of our country. We feel it important that the U.S.
maintain a strong military presence in the area. Breaking our
faith with the people of Taiwan would only weaken us in the eyes
of the other nations of the area, and would strengthen the position
of the Communists.
We find it ironic that we seem to be having trouble over the
use of our bases in the Philippines, whereas the ROC no doubt
would cooperate with us fully in our objective of having a strong
forward defense in the Western Pacific Island chain.
The foregoing listing represents only a sampling of the issues
which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken
toward normalization with the PRC.
G. CONCLUSION
We do not disagree with the objectives of keeping the two
Communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., but we
feel that this objective can be accomplished through skillful
negotiating, without sacrificing the people of the ROC or the U.S.
position in the Far East. We believe that the PRC has more to
gain from normalization of relations between the two countries
than does the U.S., and that the U.S. should negotiate more from
a position of strength. It appears that a group within the U.S.
Government is so intent with normalizing relations with the PRC
"before it's too late," that they are proposing giving in to the
demands of the PRC in the hope that they will agree to
normalization. We should have learned by now that this is no way
to negotiate with the Communists.
The PRC has stated three demands in the Shanghai
Communique. We believe that the U.S. negotiators should firmly
state two conditions. One should be to keep the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the ROC, and the second should be to protect U.S.
economic interests with Taiwan. If these two conditions are not
met, then it is our judgment that normalization of relations is not
worth the price.
Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Simon for his very excellent summari-
zation of the view of the American business community in
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
Taiwan, which represented, of course, some of the largest business
interests in this country. He thought that it was important that we
should take seriously what they said. He then invited Dr. Yuan-li
Wu of Hoover Institution to present the paper on the economic
impact of US-PRC relations on the ROC; this paper was prepared
jointly by Dr. Wu and Dr. K. C. Yeh. He also expressed his regret
that one of the co-authors of the paper, Dr. K. C. Yeh of The Rand
Corporation, could not come because of his overseas trip.
Drs. Wu and Yeh's paper discussed the economic impact of
United States-People's Republic of China relations on the
Republic of China. Their purpose was to examine factors
contributing to the rapid expansion of exports in Taiwan and to
Taiwan's economic growth and to determine how these factors
would be affected by the alternatives for changing relations with
the ROC.
Taiwanese expansion in exports is correlated with United
States direct investment. This is what Dr. Wu termed a linear
correlation, that is, exports from Taiwan come from United States
and Japanese manufacturers. Dr. Wu stated that for continued
export growth there must be continued investment and continued
increase in importation by the United States. However, continued
export growth depends on the political climate. Investors expect
stability, and the best way to eliminate uncertainties is for the
United States to make clear that present relations will continue.
Dr. Wu identified three alternatives: (1) continuation of the
status quo, (2) diplomatic recognition of Peking and abandonment
of the Republic of China, and (3) diplomatic recognition of both
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Dr. Wu
prefers the third alternative, the so-called German plan.
Dr. Wu stated that if the legal status of Taiwan is questioned,
a situation would arise where problems are created for business-
men by other countries. Some of those problems identified were
threats to curtail freedom of access to transportation and
resources, legal redress, and sea rights. Such problems would
require private intervention and Dr. Wu questioned whether
anyone would be willing to assist. Dr. Wu suggested that the
"open door" should swing both ways.
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Wu and
Dr. Yeh.]
